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Motivation
?The 67-year-old owner of a
savings and loan association
diverted millions of dollars in
corporate funds to cover his own
bad investments. The final cost
of the savings and loan fraud to
taxpayers was $2.5 billion.
?A female bank teller, 24, pilfered
$22 from her cash drawer and
originally claimed the money
was due to "shortages." She
later confessed.
http://www.acfe.com/documents/Report_to_the_Nation.pdf
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Methodology
Given Problem
Given Problem
?Given a backend algorithm of the European SUPER project
?Given a workflow description
?Given the task to model user information into the workflow description
Given Goal
? Is it possible to automatically generate fraud patterns
Procedure
?Analysing the algorithm and its papers
? Implementing scenarios in the algorithm‘s file format by hand
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Technical Information
User Information
? In a SAP system users get work centers assigned
?Work centers encapsulate roles
?Roles encapsulate privileges
WorkCenter Role
Privilege
0..* 0..*
0..*
0..*
User
0..*
0..*
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Technical Information
Workflow
? In modern companies workflows are implemented as web services
?Web services are loosely bound applications which need to be
concatenated to workflows
?Automatic concatenation needs annotations of web services
?Annotations will be used to add user information to web services
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Technical Information
Workflow
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Technical Information
Workflow
Segregation of Duties
?Money change hands ? more than one official in charge
?More people control a workflow
?Chances are higher that there is no fraud conducted
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Technical Information
A General Reasoner
Ingo Weber,
MAESTRO, 2008
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Technical Information
Composer
Taxonomy
???B ? ¬A v B
Ontology
?Objects
?Attributes
?Relations
?Function Terms
?Restrictions
?Rules
?Axioms
?Events
?Ontologies can describe attributes and their relations
?E.g. That employees are friends or married
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Technical Information
Composer
SUPER‘s composer
?can only detect a single sequence of actions to satisfy initial and
goal conditions
?cannot find anything that is not written in its configuration
?Cannot automatically detect all fraudulent concatenations
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Conclusion
Fraud Detection System
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?Currently in development by Cristina Fortu
?Generated fraud patterns can enrich its repository
?Patterns can be generated by analysing supersets of privileges
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